About the Author:  Sean Gorman founded FortiusOne in 2005 to bring location based analytics to the mass market. Sean brings over 10 years of experience at the forefront of the geospatial revolution as a researcher, practitioner, and entrepreneur at FortiusOne. Through both academic and entreprenurial efforts he has been working to make geographic data more accessible to the public since 1997 culminating in the creation of GeoCommons – a crowd-sourced repository of statistical data and social feeds that can be easily mapped, remixed and reused by non-technical users. Sean has been featured in media such as, Wired, Der Spiegel, ABC, Washington Post, Business 2.0, MSNBC, CBS and CNN. He also holds a PhD. From George Mason University in Public Policy where he was the Provost’s High Potential Scholar and was the recipient of the Fischer Prize. He has published dozens of articles on geographic data sharing and analysis, and authored the book Networks, Complexity and Security: The Role of Public Policy in Critical Infrastructure Protection. Read more from this author

At FortiusOne we’ve been collecting Afghanistan geographic data for a couple of years, so it was with great interest we read Maj. Gen. Flynn’s report on the state on intelligence in Afghanistan. Flynn’s assessment was blunt and direct – the current approach to military intelligence in Afghanistan is failing.

Specifically, the Flynn report comes to the conclusion that current intelligence is too focused on directly hunting members of the insurgency and applying kinetic means to disrupt or destroy them. This passage from the report summarizes the status quo well:

“Understandably galled by IED strikes that are killing soldiers, these intelligence shops react by devoting most of their resources to finding the people who emplace such devices. Analysts painstakingly diagram insurgent networks and recommend individuals who should be killed or captured. Aerial drones and other collection assets are tasked with scanning the countryside around the clock in the hope of spotting insurgents burying bombs or setting up ambushes. Again, these are fundamentally worthy objectives, but relying on them exclusively baits intelligence shops into reacting to enemy tactics at the expense of finding ways to strike at the very heart of the insurgency.”

Flynn is a student of history and relates the failures of the Soviets in their own campaign in Afghanistan, “The Soviets experienced this reality in the 1980s, when despite killing hundreds of thousands of Afghans, they faced a larger insurgency near the end of the war than they did at the beginning.” So, what is the alternative the tradition search (intel) and destroy (operations) approach to fighting the Afghan insurgency?

Flynn’s alternative is building an intelligence establishment that focuses on understanding the population and their environment. The premise being that if the American military can understand the reason why the local population supports the insurgents and target areas where there is dissatisfaction with insurgent activities, they can isolate and disengage insurgents by providing a better alternative. While this is not a new concept – often called “soft power” or when blended “smart power” – Flynn is pointing out that the strategy is not aligning with current intelligence tactics on the ground.

While there has been criticism in how the message was delivered and it’s style. There seems to be consensus that the conclusions are correct. The challenge is breaking the cycle which perpetuates the intelligence status quo. In addition to years of entrenchment and bureaucracy the status quo is incredibly lucrative for a large number of companies in the military industrial complex.

The “search and destroy” mission requires a lot of expensive kinetic technology. America has a massive industry to build and support these technologies, and an extensive network of lobbyists to ensure their long life. What Flynn and company are proposing in the position paper does not call for an increase in current technologies. From my perspective I can see why the team chose unorthodox channels to release the paper. Not only was it critical of current intelligence efforts it could mean a shift in spending that could impact many in the military industrial complex. One of the greatest challenges in change will be getting the self-licking ice cream cone to adapt. Simply because there is not an economic incentive to adapt currently.

The upside is that markets are quite good at adapting, but incentives have to be put in place. Quite simply put if Flynn’s objective are going to be met funding mandates are going to have to be aligned with them. Otherwise the industrial side of the complex is going to fight change that decreases profitability, and use their political clout to ensure it gets stymied at the highest levels. We all know what happens with the local congressional representative when a military program in their district is threatened to be cut.

That all said I think there are some phenomenal projects underway addressing the need to understand the socio-cultural dimensions of Afghanistan. Linton Wells “STAR-TIDES” project has made tremendous headway. Dave Warner and Todd Huffman’s “Synergy Strike Force” has really innovated in the areas of socio-cultural data collection and sharing in Afghanistan (specifically in the Nangarhar district). Also Matt McNabb’s “Transnational Crisis Project” is taking innovative approaches to the cross border dimensions of socio-cultural landscapes, specifically the linkages between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Last but not least the National Democratic Institute’s efforts to map election data and sentiment in Afghanistan. Would be great to hear about other projects that are addressing the needs of the community. Please post anything additional. I’d like to follow up this post with how some current projects are addressing the needs highlighted in Flynn’s report.

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